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I 
Pharmaceuticals, Intransigent Member 
States and a Single Market 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) accounts for one-third of the world 
market in pharmaceutical products. l Pharmaceutical expenditures 
have constituted as much as 10.5 percent of the EU's total health 
care spending.2 Despite these figures, the European Economic Com-
mission (Commission) recently noted that the European pharma-
ceutical industry is in jeopardy oflosing its status as a world player.3 
On March 2, 1994, the Commission responded to this development 
and again adopted guidelines for creating a Single Market for phar-
maceutical products.4 
Unlike with many other EU products, however, recent history 
dictates that a Single Market for pharmaceuticals is more easily 
proposed than realized.5 Existing Member State regulations and 
concerns regarding the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals have 
consistently thwarted legislation focused on removing barriers in the 
I Louis H. Orzack et aI., Pharmaceutical Regulation in the European Community: Barriers to 
Single Market Integration, 17 J. HEALTH. POL.. POL'y. & L. 847, 848 (1992). 
2Id. These expenditures represent European Community spending in 1988. Id. 
3 Reuter Textline, Mar. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File. The Euro-
pean pharmaceutical industry recently experienced a slowdown and is expected to lose nearly 
27,000 jobs in the next three years. Gillian Tett & Daniel Green, Europe Lagging in Drugs 
Research, FIN. TIMEs(London), Mar. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File. 
Moreover, European companies spend half as much on research and development (R&D) 
than their American competitors. Id. 
4 Reuter Textline, March 2, 1994, supra note 3. The Commission noted that a better 
integrated market with more competition would nurture the resurgence of the European 
pharmaceutical industry. Id. See also Coopers & Lybrand, EC Commentaries, Pharmaceuticals, 
§ 2.3, March 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurscp File. The development of a 
Single Market would "establish economies of scale through free movement of pharmaceuticals 
and ... public social security expenditure[s would] be reduced." Id.; see also HANS SMIT & 
PETER E. HERZOG, THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON 
THE EEC TREATY § 2 at 2-121 (1993) [hereinafter LAW OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMU-
NITY] (a Single Market eliminates all obstacles to the free flow of goods between Member 
States) . 
5 See Orzack, supra note 1, at 847. Since 1965, efforts to establish a Single Market for 
pharmaceuticals have been largely unsuccessful. See generally Andres Geddes, Free Movement 
of Pharmaceuticals Within the Community: The Remaining Barriers, 16 EUR. L. REv. 295 (1991). 
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pharmaceutical market.6 Price disparities among the Member States 
as well as a desire to retain control of spending on pharmaceuti-
cals have similarly inhibited a Single Market governed by a central 
authority.7 As a result, consumers have been deprived of the benefits 
of a Single Market.8 
This Comment examines the EU pharmaceutical market and its 
attempts to establish a Single Market. Part I reviews articles 30 and 
36 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity (Treaty) and their relation to the pharmaceutical industry. Part 
II examines the history of EU pharmaceutical directives. Part III 
discusses the Commission's most recent attempts at establishing a 
Single Market: Council Directive 93/39 and Council Regulation 
2309/93. Finally, Part IV suggests that a Single Market is in the best 
interests of the Member States and the pharmaceutical industry. 
1. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TREATY: ARTICLES 30 & 36 
Article 30 is intended to establish the free movement of goods 
within the EU.9 It prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports be-
tween Member States and measures having a similar effect. lO While 
the phrase "quantitative restrictions" was uncontroversial,ll the phrase 
"measures having a similar effect" was initially subject to an inter-
pretation which excluded pharmaceuticals from its purview.12 
6 See generally Geddes, supra note 5. See also Orzack, supra note 1, at 851. The regulatory 
arrangements instituted by national governments vary in form and substance in relation to 
each government's traditions, their legislative histories, political traditions, and economic and 
technological resources. Id. Cultural factors, including local traditions, the degree of accep-
tance of folk remedies, religious beliefs, and marketing practices, enhance or detract from 
the authority accorded to public regulatory bodies. Id. In addition, a variety of local political 
issues affect the public regulation of pharmaceutical medicines. Id. 
7 Leigh Hancher, The European Pharmaceutical Market: Problems of Partial Harmonisation, 
15 EUR. L. REv. 9 (1991). Pharmaceutical prices among Member States differ by as much as 
500%. Id. at 9. See also Paul Abrahams, Life in the Single Market: The bell tolls for drugs harmony, 
FIN. TIMEs(London),jan. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File. 
S FIN. TIMES, supra note 7. See generally Case C-62/90, EC Commission v. Germany, 2 
C.M.L.R. 549 (1992). A German law prohibited individuals from importing pharmaceuticals 
into Germany, even though they were prescribed by a doctor and in quantities which did not 
exceed personal needs, because the particular medicine was available in Germany only by 
prescription. Id. 
9 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 2.1. 
10 LAw OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, supra note 4, § 30.1; see also TREATY ESTABLISH-
ING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 30. Article 30 states: "Quanti-
tative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall ... be prohibited 
between Member States." Id. 
II See LAW OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, supra note 4, § 30.1. 
12 See id. The initial narrow interpretation of "measures having a similar effect" simply 
prohibited Member States from discriminating against imports and exports, such as pharma-
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In Procureur du Hoi v. Dassonville,13 however, the European Court of 
i Justice (ECJ) interpreted article 30 as prohibiting "all trading rules 
enacted by Member States, which are capable of hindering, directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade."14 Con-
sequently, pharmaceutical products came under the auspices of 
article 30.15 
Article 36, on the other hand, recognizes that the EEC Treaty was 
not intended to deny Member States of all their power to regulate 
imports and exports.16 Article 36 permits prohibitions or restrictions 
on both imported and exported products to the extent necessary to 
effectuate national policies, including the protection of human lifeP 
Member States, however, have frequently employed the protection 
of human life exemption to justifY unnecessary restrictions on the 
free movement of pharmaceuticals. IS 
In Officer Van justitie v. De Peijper,19 a Dutch law required importers 
to furnish an information file on each imported drug, regardless of 
whether a previous importer had already supplied an identical file. 20 
In response, the ECJ held that article 36 should be interpreted 
strictly and restrictions based on the protection of human life should 
ceuticals. [d. Impediments to traderesulting from disparities in national laws-laws which did 
not specifically govern imports-were not considered within the scope of Article 30. [d. Given 
the divergent pharmaceutical regulations of Member States, medicines were often subject to 
national laws which inhibited their free movement. See generally EC Commission v. Germany, 
2 C.M.L.R. 549 (1992). 
13 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 2 C.M.L.R. 436 (1974). 
14 [d.; see also LAW OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, supra note 4, § 30.1. This 
judgment meant that Member State's laws and regulations relating to imports were subject to 
Article 30. [d. 
15 See LAw OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, supra note 4, § 30.1. The ECl's decision 
in Procureur du Rni v. Dassonville also established a "rule of reason" which tempered the 
principle of free movement of goods. [d. This rule recognizes the need of Member States to 
"ensure that certain interests or values are protected in the general interest." [d. § 30.3. 
Measures justified on grounds of consumer protection are one justification which falls within 
the "rule of reason." [d. Thus, the free movement of pharmaceuticals may be inhibited by 
national regulations premised on consumer protection. See id. 
16 LAw OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, supra note 4, § 36.01. 
17 [d; see also EEC TREATY art. 36. Article 36 states, in part: 
[d. 
The provisions of Articl [e] 30 ... shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of ... public policy ... ; the 
protection of health and life of humans .... Such prohibitions or restrictions shall 
not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction 
on trade between Member States. 
18 LAw OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, supra note 4, § 36.02. 
19 Case 104/75, Officer Van Justitie v. De Peijper, 1976 E.C.R. 613, 2 C.M.L.R. 271 (1976). 
20 [d. 
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only be allowed when genuinely necessary.21 Similarly, in EC Com-
mission v. Germany,22 the German government prohibited individu-
als from importing pharmaceuticals into Germany on the basis of 
article 36.23 The EC] held that the German restrictions were incom-
patible with article 36 because they were not necessary for the 
effective protection of the health and life of humans.24 In short, 
these cases illustrate the reluctance of Member States to permit the 
free flow of pharmaceuticals within the EU. 
II. EU PHARMACEUTICAL DIRECTIVES 
On January 26, 1965, the first pharmaceutical directive was 
adopted. 25 Council Directive 65/65 (Directive 65/65) codified the 
fundamental principles which govern proprietary medicinal prod-
ucts in the EU.26 Directive 65/65's significance lay in its declaration 
that no medicinal product could be marketed in the EU without 
prior authorization. 27 Like successive Council Directives aimed at 
establishing a Single Market for pharmaceuticals, Directive 65/65 
encountered resistance from its inception to its implementation.28 
Some Member States initially resisted the requirement that a 
product's therapeutic effect be substantiated.29 Their proposed al-
ternative, proving therapeutic effect only for those pharmaceuticals 
marketed Community-wide, was ultimately rejected because it would 
have allowed the pharmaceutical industry to partition the market.30 
21Id. 
222 C.M.L.R. 549 (1992). 
23 See generally supra note 8. 
24EC Commission v. Germany, 2 C.M.L.R. 549 (1992). 
25 Council Directive 65/65,1965-1966 OJ. SPEC. ED. 20 [hereinafter Directive 65/65]; see 
also Orzack, supra note 1, at 853. 
26 Hancher, supra note 7, at 12; Directive 65/65, supra note 25, art. 1, § 1. Article 1(1) 
defines a proprietary medicinal product as "[a]ny ready-prepared medicinal product placed 
on the market under a special name and in a special pack." Id. 
27 Hancher, supra note 7, at 12; see also Directive 65/65, supra note 25, art. 3. Authorization 
required that each application be accompanied by documentation supporting the safety, 
quality, and therapeutic efficacy of the product. Id. art. 4. Each application also had to be 
signed by experts with "the necessary technical or professional qualifications." Orzack, supra 
note 1, at 853-54. 
28 Hancher, supra note 7, at 12; Orzack, supra note 1, at 854. 
29 See generally supra note 27. See also Hancher, supra note 7, at 12. 
30 Hancher, supra note 7, at 12. More precisely, companies would have been able to market 
products nationally under less stringent requirements. Id. While finally agreeing to the pro-
posal, the Germans initially balked because, as the president of the German Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer's Federation announced, "German legislation on medicines ... does not re-
quire proof of effectiveness." Orzack, supra note 1, at 854 (citing C. Engelhorn, The German 
Pharmaceutical Industry in the EEC, 431 OPERA MUNDI EUROPE (1967)). 
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Resistance was also encountered with registering drugs already ap-
proved and available in the EU.3! Finally, some commentators antici-
pated objections if the Commission failed to consult the pharmaceu-
tical community when developing "standards and protocols. "32 
Although the Commission planned to adopt additional directives 
soon after Directive 65/65 was implemented, Member State regula-
tions inhibited further progress on automatic mutual recognition.33 
Specifically, the divergence of Member State regulations governing 
entry into the pharmaceutical market and the reluctance of each 
Member State to abandon them slowed harmonization efforts. 34 For 
instance, West Germany refused to drop its simple registration pro-
cedures unless the other EU states "agreed to introduce mutual 
recognition procedures at the same time."35 
In 1974, with no additional directives passed, the Commission 
proposed a directive concerning the manufacture of pharmaceuti-
cals.36 Like its predecessor, this draft directive was resisted because 
it initially specified that only pharmacists could supervise the manu-
facturing of drugs. 37 While a broader range of supervisory personnel 
was ultimately approved, the reaction of Member States indicated 
that harmonization efforts would continue to be met with resis-
tance.38 
In 1975 two additional pharmaceutical directives were ratified after 
the Commission postponed its plans for automatic mutual recogni-
tion.39 Council Directive 75/318 (Directive 75/318) established uni-
form procedures to be followed in the clinical trials necessary for 
marketing approva1.40 The more important directive, Council Direc-
tive 75/319 (Directive 75/319), established the Committee for Pro-
prietary Medicinal Products (CPMP).41 Comprised of representatives 
of the Member States and of the Commission, the CPMP's stated task 
was to "facilitate the adoption of a common position by the Member 
States regarding marketing authorizations .... "42 The CPMP, how-
310rzack, supra note 1, at 854. 
32 See id. 
33 Hancher, supra note 7, at 13. 
34Id. 
35Id. 
360rzack, supra note 1, at 854. 
37Id. 
38 See Geddes, supra note 5, at 297. 
39 Hancher, supra note 7, at 13. 
40 Id.; see also Council Directive 75/318, 1975 OJ. 1 [hereinafter Directive 75/318]. 
41 Hancher, supra note 7, at 13; see also Council Directive 75/319, 1975 OJ. 13, ch. 3 
[hereinafter Directive 75/319]. 
42 Directive 75/319, supra note 41, at ch. 3, art. 8, § 1. 
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ever, acted only when an applicant had received market authoriza-
tion from one Member State and wanted to place the product on 
the market of at least five other Member States.43 Once the relevant 
documents were received from the applicant, the CPMP would for-
ward the information to the respective national licensing authori-
ties.44 When a Member State refused to authorize the marketing of 
the product in question, it was required to provide a reasoned 
objection to the CPMP,45 which would then issue its own opinion on 
the application.46 Regardless of the CPMP's opinion, however, Mem-
ber States retained their sovereign right to reject the applicationY 
As a result, Directive 75/319 was principally a procedural mandate. 
Although it was an incremental step in the process of establishing 
a Single Market, the CPMP was largely unsuccessful,48 The proce-
dure was not only cumbersome but few companies sought simulta-
neous marketing in five states.49 More importantly, Member States 
resisted adopting each others' pharmaceutical product evaluations. 50 
Member States simply preferred to exercise their sovereign right to 
conduct an investigation.51 
Confronted with the ineffectiveness of the CPMP, the Commission 
once again considered establishing a single centralized authority 
responsible for registering medicinal products.52 Recognizing, how-
ever, the practical realities which would inhibit such a centralized 
authority, the Commission selected a more conservative approach.53 
The result, Council Directive 83/570 (Directive 83/570),54 revised 
the CPMP and strengthened the multi-state procedure.55 Applicants 
431d. at ch. 3, art. 9, § l. 
44 ld. § 2. 
451d. art. 10, § 2. 
461d. art. 11, § 1-3. 
47 Hancher, supra note 7, at 13. 
48 Geddes, supra note 5, at 297. 
49 Hancher, supra note 7, at 14. During its first four years, the CPMP received only four 
applications. ld. Moreover, every application was rejected by at least one Member State. ld. 
50 Geddes, supra note 5, at 297; see also Orzack, supra note 1, at 856. The discretion given 
to Member States also led to delays in an application's processing. ld. Member States were 
allowed 120 days to act on an application forwarded by the CPMP. Directive 75/319, supra 
note 41, at ch. 3, art. 10, § 1 
51 Geddes, supra note 5, at 297. 
52 Hancher, supra note 7, at 14-15. 
531d. The pharmaceutical industry pushed for automatic mutual recognition at that time. 
ld. The idea was opposed by consumer organizations because they believed a company would 
be able to conform to the least stringent market authorization requirements and then distrib-
ute their product throughout the EU, effectively weakening EU safety standards. ld. 
54 Hancher, supra note 7, at 15; Council Directive 83/570, 1983 OJ. (L332) I [hereinafter 
Directive 83/570]. 
55 Hancher, supra note 7, at 15. 
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were permitted to submit an application for market authorization 
in only two Member States.56 Member States also were required to 
compile an assessment report on each application.57 This not only 
allowed Member States to become familiar with different national 
evaluation techniques, but also provided an opportunity for a Mem-
ber State to forego its own thorough investigation if it was satisfied 
with another Member State's evaluation procedures.58 While the 
revised CPMP procedure was popular among pharmaceutical com-
panies, Member States complained that the 120 day time limit was 
too short.59 In reality, Member States were still reluctant to adopt 
each others assessments.60 Like its predecessor, Directive 75/319, 
Directive 83/570 was ultimately more rhetoric than reality. 
In an effort to resolve these concerns, the Commission adopted 
a number of directives in 198761 which were designed to harmonize 
further national testing procedures.62 In particular, the CPMP was 
required to review products derived from biotechnology and issue 
an opinion in advance of a Member State's assessment; an opinion 
which the Commission hoped would be followed by Member States.63 
While the Commission believed this was a significant step towards a 
single evaluation procedure,64 Member States continued to conduct 
their own independent examinations.65 The CPMP recognized as 
much when it noted that " ... [r]esults ... do not show any real 
progress towards mutual recognition. Each concerned Member State 
seemed to conduct its own assessment and raised its own objec-
tions."66 
Although the decentralized procedure instituted by the CPMP 
failed to establish mutual recognition,67 the Commission continued 
56 Directive 83/570, supra note 54, art. 9; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
57 Directive 83/570, supra note 54, art. 13. 
58 Hancher, supra note 7, at 15. 
59 Id.; see also supra note 50. 
60 Hancher, supra note 7, at 15. "Such diligence reflects not only divergent medical tradi-
tions and practices, but also the reluctance of one licensing authority to shoulder the moral, 
political and possibly legal consequences of another's risk/benefit calculations." Id. 
61Id. (citing Council Directive 87/18,1987 OJ. (L 15/29); Council Directive 87/19,1987 
OJ. (L 15/31); Council Directive 87/21,1987 OJ. (L 15/36); Council Directive 87/22,1987 
OJ. (L 15/38). 
62 Geddes, supra note 5, at 297. 
63Id. 
64 Hancher, supra note 7, at 16. 
65 Geddes, supra note 5, at 297. 
660rzack, supra note 1, at 856 (quoting COMMITTEE FOR PROPRIETARY MEDICINAL PROD-
UCTS, CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A FUTURE MARKETING AUTHORIZATION SYSTEM, III/3785/88 
BRUSSELS: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 2). 
67 Hancher, supra note 7, at 16. 
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to draft directives inclined towards that route.68 In 1989, the Com-
mission adopted four directives69 aimed at reducing disparities in 
Member State legislation or administrative practices which hindered 
trade. 70 The Commission also adopted Council Directive 89/105, 
which protected the pharmaceutical industry from price discrimina-
tion among Member States.71 
In 1992, the Commission adopted three additional directives,72 
two of which explicitly noted that "it [was] important to adopt 
measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal 
market .... "73 Council Directive 92/25 (Directive 92/25) regulated 
the wholesale distribution of medicinal products "so as to guarantee 
that such products are stored, transported and handled in suitable 
conditions."74 In effect, the Commission adopted Directive 92/25 in 
an effort to preempt potential distribution problems associated with 
an internal market. 75 
Council Directive 92/26 (Directive 92/26), on the other hand, 
sought to remedy existing problems which confronted consumers 
who, while traveling throughout the Member States, needed to pur-
chase pharmaceuticals or traveled with their own supply.76 This Di-
68 See id. at 17. 
69 Council Directive 89/341,1989 OJ. (L 142) (covering generic products); Council Direc-
tive 89/342,1989 OJ. (L 142) (covering immunological medicinal products); Council Direc-
tive 89/343, 1989 OJ. (L 142) (covering radiopharmaceuticals); Council Directive 89/381, 
1989 OJ. (L 181) (covering medicinal products derived from human blood or plasma). 
70 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 4.5. These directives were also intended to strengthen 
public health safeguards. Id. 
71 Council Directive 89/105, 1989 OJ. (L 40); see also supra note 7; Coopers & Lybrand, 
supra note 4, § 15.1. "All Member States have adopted measures to control public expenditure 
on pharmaceuticals but the disparities that exist in the national systems of price control and 
social security reimbursement greatly affect intra-Community trade in medicinal products." 
Id. 
72 See Council Directive 92/25, 1992 OJ. (L ll3) [hereinafter Directive 92/25]; Council 
Directive 92/26, 1992 OJ. (L ll3) [hereinafter Directive 92/26]; Council Directive 92/28, 
1992 OJ. (L ll3) [hereinafter Directive 92/28]. 
73 Directive 92/25, supra note 72, at Introduction; see also Directive 92/26, supra note 72, 
at Introduction. Directive 92/28 supplements a previous Council Directive and therefore was 
not in and of itself aimed at creating a Single Market. See Directive 92/28, supra note 72, at 
Introduction. 
74 Directive 92/25, supra note 72, at Introduction. 
75 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 8.1. "[T]he completion of the internal market is 
likely to make the operation of the traditional supervision of the distribution system and the 
operation of the batch recall system more difficult." Id. 
76 Directive 92/26, supra note 72, at Introduction. " ... [t]he conditions for the supply of 
medicinal products for human use to the public vary appreciably from one Member State to 
another; ... medicinal products sold without prescriptions in certain Member States can be 
obtained only on medical prescription in other Member States." Id. See also EC Commission 
v. Germany, supra note 8, and accompanying text. 
ii' 
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rective established a legal classification for medicinal products so 
that the requirements for supplying pharmaceuticals would be uni-
form.77 Council Directive 92/28, the third pharmaceutical directive 
adopted in 1992, harmonized national laws on the advertising of 
medicinal products. 78 Although each of these directives inched the 
ED toward the establishment of a Single Market for pharmaceuti-
cals, Member States continued to resist meaningful developments. 
III. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 93/39 & COUNCIL REGULATION 2309/93 
Published on the same day, Council Directive 93/39 (Directive 
93/39)19 and Council Regulation 2309/93 (Regulation 2309/93)80 
represent the Commission's most recent attempts to simplifY the 
market authorization procedure for pharmaceuticals.8! Directive 93/39 
is intended to ensure that Member States do not unnecessarily 
duplicate the efforts of other states when reviewing an application 
for market authorization.82 Regulation 2309/93 creates the Euro-
pean Agency for the Evaluation of Medical Products (EAEM). 83 Like 
Directive 93/39, the stated task of Regulation 2309/93 is to coordi-
nate the process of evaluating and supervising pharmaceuticals at 
the Member State level in order to avoid needless duplication.84 
A. Directive 93/39 
Directive 93/39 is intended to ensure that one Member State's 
market authorization for a pharmaceutical product is recognized by 
all other Member States.85 The directive requires Member States to 
forward to the EAEM86 a copy of their market authorization, their 
77 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 8.2. See generally Directive 92/26, supra note 72. 
78 Directive 92/28, supra note 72, at Introduction. " ... there are disparities between these 
[advertising] measures; ... these disparities are likely to have an impact on the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market, since advertising disseminated in one Member State 
is likely to have effects in other Member States." [d. 
79 Council Directive 93/39,1993 OJ. (L 214) [hereinafter Directive 93/39]. 
80 Council Regulation 2309/93, 1993 OJ. (L 214) [hereinafter Regulation 2309/93]. 
81 See generally Directive 93/39, supra note 79; Regulation 2309/93, supra note 80. 
82 Directive 93/39, supra note 79, at Introduction. 
83 Regulation 2309/93, supra note 80, at Introduction. 
84 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 7.3. 
85 Directive 93/39, supra note 79, at Introduction. While not an affirmative obligation on 
Member States, the Introduction states that recognition should be granted "unless there are 
serious grounds for supposing that the authorization of the medicinal product concerned 
may present risk to the public health." [d. Member States are required to comply with 
provisions of this directive by January 1, 1995. Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 4.3. 
86 See generally Regulation 2309/93, supra note 80. See also Directive 93/39, supra note 79, 
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assessment report, and a summary of the product's characteristics.87 
The EAEM then assigns the authorized product a European register 
number which is marked on the product's packaging.88 Other Mem-
ber States considering a subsequent application for market authori-
zation are required to request the product's assessment report on 
file with the EAEM.89 Once received, the reviewing Member State 
has ninety days to recognize the decision of the first Member State 
or notifY the CPMP, the other Member States concerned, and the 
applicant of its reasoned objection(s).9o 
When a Member State disagrees with another Member State's 
initial authorization, both Member States are required to "use their 
best endeavors to reach an agreement on the action to be taken in 
respect of the application. "91 Moreover, the applicant is provided an 
opportunity to address the relevant Member States concerning his 
application.92 If a consensus can not be reached, the Member States 
are required to refer the disagreement to the CPMP.93 Upon notifica-
tion of the dispute, the CPMP has ninety days to issue an opinion 
which is binding on the interested Member States.94 Directive 93/39, 
therefore, resolves the issue of market authorization unlike the 
previous procedure established in Directive 75/319 which permitted 
Member States to reject an application without a binding opinion 
by the CPMP.95 
Although Directive 93/39 is the most compulsory directive with 
regard to mutual recognition, it does not affect a Member State's 
right to set prices for pharmaceuticals if based on health, economic, 
or social conditions.96 Similarly, matters concerning the sale, supply, 
or use of medicinal products as contraceptives or abortifacients are 
not within the purview of Directive 93/39.97 In short, while the 
directive requires more of Member States, it does not encroach on 
their economic or moral sovereignty. 
art. 1. Member States now have 210 days to review an application for a product not previously 
marketed in another state. Id. 
87 Directive 93/39, supra note 79, art. 1, § 4. 
88 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 4.3. 
89 Directive 93/39, supra note 79, art. 1, § 7. 
90Id. art. 9, § 4; see also Directive 75/319, supra note 41, art. 10, § 2. 
91 Directive 93/39, supra note 79, art. 10, § 2. 
92Id. 
93Id. 
94Id. art. 13, § 1; art. 14, § 4. 'The Member States shall either grant or withdraw marketing 
authorization, or vary the terms of a marketing authorization as necessary to comply with the 
decision within 30 days of its notification." Id. art. 14, § 4. 
95 See generally Directive 93/39, supra note 79. See also Directive 75/319, supra note 41. 
96 Directive 93/39, supra note 79, art. 1, §§ 1,5. 
97Id. art. 1, § 5. 
I 
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!I 
B. Regulation 2309/93 
I Adopted on July 22, 1993, Regulation 2309/93 created the Euro-
pean Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products.98 Its task is 
to coordinate the process of evaluating and supervising pharmaceu-
ticals at the Member State level in order to avoid duplication among 
Member States.99 The EAEM, under which the CPMP is now sub-
sumed,Ioo is principally designed to ensure that all relevant factors 
are considered during the authorization process. lOI 
The most progressive feature of Regulation 2309/93 was the crea-
tion of "a centralized Community authorization procedure for tech-
nologically advanced medicinal products, in particular those derived 
from biotechnology. "102 While this procedure mandates that data on 
a biotechnological product be submitted to the EAEM, the EAEM 
does not make a decision, but rather forwards the application to the 
Commission with its expert opinion.103 Unless an objection is raised, 
the Commission will adopt a decision within thirty days.104 
Companies offering new products which are not based on bio-
technology have the option of this centralized approach or the 
national decentralized procedures. 105 Under the decentralized or 
mutual recognition approach, the EAEM will only be involved if a 
dispute arises between Member States regarding the safety or ef-
ficacy of a product. 106 By 1996, it is predicted that the mutual recog-
nition approach will be the most widely employed system.107 
98 Regulation 2309/93, supra note 80, art. 1 states " ... the primary task of the [EAEM] 
should be to provide scientific advice of the highest possible quality to the Community 
institutions and the Member States for the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by 
Community legislation in the field of medicinal products in relation to authorization and 
supervision of medicinal products." Id. at Introduction; see also Coopers & Lybrand, supra 
note 4, § 7.1. 
99 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 7.3. 
100Id. § 7.1. The purpose of this action is to ensure that no pharmaceuticals are placed on 
the market without authorization. Id. 
101Id. § 7.3. 
102Reguiation 2309/93, supra note 80, at Introduction. 
103Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 7.3. The EAEM will employ national expert in 
drafting its opinion. Id. 
104Id. If an objection is raised it is forwarded to a standing committee. Id. If the objection 
is unsuccessful, the Council Ministers will resolve the dispute. Id. 
105Id. 
106Id.; see also supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
107 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 4, § 7.3. 
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IV. THE PROMISE OF A SINGLE MARKET 
Although the Commission has adopted a cautious and deliberate 
approach to pharmaceutical legislation, Member States have consis-
tently resisted efforts to achieve automatic mutual recognition or a 
Single Market. lOS As a result, consumers and pharmaceutical compa-
nies have been deprived of the benefits of a free market. While 
Member State concerns are not frivolous, they are misguided. 
A Single Market for pharmaceuticals, licensed and marketed 
through a central authority, such as the EAEM, could be an effective 
proxy for individual Member State evaluation procedures. First, 
costs would be dramatically reduced for both the Member State and 
the applicant. A consolidated approach also could reduce the dura-
tion between submission of an application and its approval or rejection. 
Most importantly, a single process would ensure the quality con-
trol of pharmaceuticals more effectively than the existing Member 
State evaluation procedures. Under present EU legislation, a phar-
maceutical company may apply for market authorization in one or 
all twelve EU Member States. A company, therefore, with a new 
medicinal product which has great promise, but little data to sup-
port its efficacy, might apply to Germany-the least rigorous of all 
Member States with regard to medicinal evaluations-for market 
authorization. Once authorized in Germany, any EU citizen is capa-
ble of acquiring the drug for his or her personal needs. 109 
Moreover, drugs which offer great potential but have not been 
thoroughly tested are in great demand among patients desperate to 
find a cure for their malady. Thus, concerns regarding the safety 
and efficacy of new drugs might be more appropriately addressed 
through a central authority. 
The recent decline of the European pharmaceutical industry in 
the world market also militates in favor of a Single Market for 
pharmaceuticals. Under current conditions, it is probable that phar-
maceutical companies resist developing all but the most promising 
pharmaceuticals. Research and development on progressive phar-
maceuticals would be fiscally irresponsible when market authoriza-
tion depends on twelve autonomous and distinct evaluations. A 
central authorization procedure would encourage companies to com-
mit more money to research and development because each prod-
108 See generally supra note 6. 








1995] EU PHARMACEUTICALS 483 
uct would have only one hurdle to clear. As a result, consumers 
throughout the ED would benefit from increased product availabil-
ity and the consequent price stabilization. In addition, pharmaceu-
tical companies would be able to participate in the development of 
sensible and acceptable standards. 
CONCLUSION 
While the focus of ED pharmaceutical legislation is on the re-
moval of unjustified barriers to trade, most pharmaceutical direc-
tives have merely harmonized national procedures for the registration 
of medicinal products. Nevertheless, Member States have steadfastly 
maintained their commitment to national evaluation procedures. A 
Single Market, however, is a better mechanism for ensuring the 
safety and effectiveness of pharmaceuticals as well as assisting the 
European pharmaceutical industry in regaining its competitive edge 
in the world market. 
Christopher R Smith 
